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Nothing New Under the Sun:
The Law-Politics Dynamic in Supreme
Court Decision Making
Stephen M. Feldman*

Abstract
Recent events have seemed to inject politics into Americanjudicial institutions. As a result, many observers worry that the Supreme Court, in particular, has become politicized. According to this view, the Justices should decide cases in accordance with the rule of law and be unmoved by political
concerns. These worries arisefrom a mistaken assumption: that law andpolitics can be separate and independentin the process ofjudicial decision making. But at the Supreme Court (as well as in the lower courts, for that matter),
decision making arisesfrom a law-politics dynamic. Adjudication in accord
with apure rule of law is a myth. Both law andpolitics shape legal interpretation and adjudication. Yet, it is worth emphasizing, the ongoing debate over
whether Supreme Court decisionmaking is either law orpolitics is thoroughly
political. This Essay elaborates on these assertions and explores their rami-

fications.

* Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming.
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INTRODUCTION

Recent events have seemed to inject politics into American judicial institutions. For example, a Republican-controlled Senate refused to consider
President Barack Obama's nominee for the Supreme Court,' and President
Donald Trump, dissatisfied with a lower court ruling, denounced the court's
"so-called judge." 2 These events have intensified many observers' worries
that the Supreme Court, in particular, has become politicized. 3 Pursuant to
this view, the Justices should decide cases in accordance with the rule of law
and be unmoved by political concerns.'
These worries arise from a mistaken assumption: that law and politics can
be separate and independent in the process of judicial decision making. But
at the Supreme Court (as well as in the lower courts, for that matter), decision
1. Wade Goodwyn & Nina Totenberg, The Casefor Republicansto ConsiderMerrick Garland's
Nomination, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/10/27/499514065/the-

case-for-republicans-to-reconsider-merrick-garlands-nomination; Michael D. Ramsey, Why the Senate Doesn't Have to Act on Merrick Garland's Nomination, THE ATLANTIC (May 15, 2016),

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/senate-obama-merrick-garland-supreme-courtnominee/482733/.
2. Thomas Fuller, So-Called'JudgeCriticizedby Trump Is Known as a MainstreamRepublican,

N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/us/james-robart-judge-trump-banseattle.html.
3.

David H. Gans, Republicans Who Block Obama 's Supreme CourtPick Are Violating the Con-

stitution, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 16, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/1 31700/republicans-blockobamas-supreme-court-pick-violating-constitution.
4. Sen. Richard Blumenthal & Monte Frank, Senate's Refusal to ConsiderGarland Undermines

Rule of Law, THE HILL (Mar. 24, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/274154senates-refusal-to-consider-garland-undermines-rule-of-law.
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making arises from a law-politics dynamic. Adjudication in accord with a
pure rule of law is a myth. Both law and politics shape legal interpretation
and adjudication. Yet, it is worth emphasizing, the ongoing debate over
whether Supreme Court decision making is either law or politics is thoroughly
political. This Essay elaborates on these assertions and explores their ramifications.
Part II of this Essay articulates two traditional and opposed views of Supreme Court adjudication: a pure-law approach typically voiced by law professors, and a pure-politics approach voiced by many political scientists. Advocates of a pure-law view usually condemn the intrusion of politics into
adjudication. Politics, they argue, corrupts the neutral application of the rule
of law. Part II also acknowledges variations within the two disciplines, law
and political science. Not all law professors follow a pure-law approach, and
not all political scientists follow a pure-politics approach. Nevertheless, law
professors and political scientists usually retreat to their respective disciplinary methods when pushed (for example, to explain a hard Supreme Court
case). Part III explains an intermediate approach to Supreme Court decision
making. Namely, law and politics dynamically interact in legal interpretation
and therefore in adjudication. Part III explains why this law-politics dynamic
undermines the traditional worries about the mixing of politics into judicial
decision making yet acknowledges that the political stakes revolving around
the opposition between law and politics are high. Part IV, the conclusion,
explores the futility and potential harms that arise from an insistence on a
pure-law approach.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF SUPREME COURT ADJUDICATION: PURE
LAW OR PURE POLITICS

Traditionally, two opposed views of Supreme Court decision making
have existed side-by-side. In the legal academy, professors have mostly

5. I have articulated and explored this law-politics dynamic in a series of articles. Stephen M.
Feldman, Fightingthe Tofu: Law andPolitics in Scholarship andAdjudication,14 CARDOZO PUB. L.,
POL'Y & ETHICS J. 91 (2015) [hereinafterFeldman, Fightingthe Tofu]; StephenM. Feldman, Supreme
CourtAlchemy: Turning Law and PoliticsInto Mayonnaise, 12 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 57 (2014)
[hereinafter Feldman, Supreme CourtAlchemy]; Stephen M. Feldman, Do Supreme CourtNominees
Lie? The PoliticsofAdjudication, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17 (2008) [hereinafterFeldman, Supreme
Court Nominees]; Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule ofLaw or the Rule ofPolitics? Harmonizing the
Internaland External Views ofSupreme CourtDecisionMaking, 30 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 89 (2005).
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claimed that the Court decides cases by following the rule of law.6 The lawthat is, legal rules and doctrines-are embodied in texts such as the Constitution, statutes, and case precedents. Thus, by reading these texts, Supreme
Court Justices discern the appropriate rules and apply them to the facts of the
instant case. Most important, then, from this law standpoint, politics should
not influence the Justices. The law must be pure; politics corrupts the judicial
process. The Justices must apply preexisting rules rather than making rules
according to their political goals. In the earliest university-based law schools,
during the post-Civil War era, the Langdellian legal scientists generally followed this approach, viewing law as a closed system of rules and axiomatic
principles. 7 Those rules and principles, according to the Langdellians, were
autonomous from societal and political influences. Thus, when deciding
cases, judges were supposed to logically apply the rules and principles while
disregarding their political preferences and even their conceptions of Justice.
This pure-law approach is currently manifested most clearly in new
originalism. According to new originalists, judges must interpret the constitutional text in accord with its original public meaning. Constitutional meaning, from this perspective, is static, fixed at the time of its ratification, regardless of changing political and societal circumstances. 9 Thus, "[w]ords have
original meanings that are fixed no matter what current majorities may say to
the contrary."o Moreover, as Randy Barnett insists, "original public meaning
is an objective fact that can be established by reference to historical materials."" According to Justice Scalia, originalism is the only interpretive method
consistent with the rule of law rather than politics. The originalist method,
6. E.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 16 (1959); C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS: WITH A
SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES viii-ix (2d ed. 1879) (preface to 1st ed.) (expressing the importance of teaching law students to apply "certain principles or doctrines .... to the evertangled skein of human affairs").
7. LANGDELL, supra note 6, at viii-ix.
8. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 91-105 (2000) (discussing Langdellian legal science).
But cf BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN
JUDGING 13-63 (2010) (arguing that Langdellians were not pure formalists, but acknowledging that
almost all legal historians characterize them as such).
9. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All OriginalistsNow, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 1, 4 (2011) (articulating the "fixation thesis").
10. Stephen G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheersfor ProfessorBalkin 's Originalism, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 663, 701 (2009).
11. Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption about ConstitutionalAssumptions, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 615, 660 (2009).
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Scalia wrote, "is the only one that can justify courts in denying force and effect
to the unconstitutional enactments of duly elected legislatures . . . . To hold a
governmental Act to be unconstitutional is not to announce that we forbid it,
but that the Constitution forbids it."' 2
Meanwhile, starting in the 1940s, political scientists began describing Supreme Court adjudication as a product of the Justices' political preferences or
attitudes rather than their adherence to legal rules and doctrines.1 3 As political
(and other social) scientists developed quantitative methodology, they refined
their political description of Supreme Court decision making.' According to
Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth's attitudinal model, "the Supreme Court
decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-a-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the Justices."" A Justice's ideological attitudes or personal policy preferences are formed exogenously to the legal system; that is,
the Justice's preferences do not form because of his or her institutional position within the federal judiciary.'" Thus, when Justices Alito and Ginsburg
disagree about the result in a case, they disagree precisely because Alito is
politically conservative while Ginsburg is progressive."' Some political scientists, most notably Lee Epstein, acknowledge that Justices sometimes adjust
their votes because of strategic considerations, such as the desire to maintain
a judicial majority in a case.' 8 But according to the pure-politics approach,
Supreme Court opinions, with their elaborate lines of reasoning built on legal
texts and precedents, are either irrelevant (at best) or duplicitous (at worst).
"Courts and judges always lie," wrote Martin Shapiro.1 9 "Lying is the nature

12. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Antonin
Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1184 (1989) ("Just as that manner
of textual exegesis facilitates formulation of general rules, so does, in the constitutional field, adherence to a more or less originalist theory of construction.").
13. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND
VALUES, 1937-1947 23 (1948) (noting that the post-New Deal Court was regarded by many to be

composed of "yes-men" appointed by President Roosevelt "who were to transform the Court into a
monolithic instrument for justifying the goals of their leader in true totalitarian fashion.").
14. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 65 (1993); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963 272 (1965).
15. SEGAL & SPAETH, supranote 14, at 65.
16. Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: PostBehavioralistApproachesto Judicial
Politics, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 611 (2000).
17. SEGAL & SPAETH, supranote 14, at 65.
18. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Political(Science) Context ofJudging, 47
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783, 798 (2003).
19. Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 155, 156 (1994).
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of the judicial activity." 20
To be sure, the two disciplines, law and political science, do not have
monopolies on either of the respective viewpoints-either the legal or the political science vantage. Some law professors have adopted perspectives that
resonate closely with the predominant political science view. In the 1930s,
some of the more radical legal realists questioned the force and coherence of
legal rules. 2 1 In fact, those realists helped set the stage for the early political
science descriptions of the Court as a political institution.22 Today, an increasing number of law professors reject a pure-law approach while acknowledging that politics plays a role in Supreme Court decision making. 23 Eric
Segall goes so far as to insist that the Supreme Court does not decide like a
traditional court at all. 24 The Justices decide cases "based much more on personal and contestable value judgments than legal reasoning." 25 The Justices,
in other words, "are not bound by preexisting law in any meaningful sense of
the word bound." 26 Meanwhile, some political scientists acknowledge that
law plays some role in Supreme Court adjudication; the Justices do not merely
vote their politics. The historical institutionalists, including Howard Gillman
and Mark Graber, are among the leaders in questioning an all-politics political
science view. 27 "Judicial decision making," writes Graber, "is a practice that

20. Id.
21. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Joseph C. Hutcheson,
Jr., The JudgmentIntuitive: The Function ofthe "Hunch"in JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELLL.Q. 274

(1929).
22. Jeffrey A. Segal, What's Law Got to Do with It: Thoughts From "The Realm ofPoliticalScience, " in WHAT'S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT'S AT

STAKE 17, 26-27 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011).
23.

BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 367-68 (2009) (explaining constitutional mean-

ing as arising from a type of "dialogue" between the people and the Justices); Kate Webber, It Is
Political: Using the Models ofJudicial Decision Making to Explain the Ideological History of Title

VII, 89 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 841, 842, 844, 853 (2015) (arguing that the Court's Title VII decisions are
political).
24. ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND ITS
JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES xvii, 1-9 (2012).

25. Id. at 2.
26. Id. at 9.
27. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 11-12 (1993); Mark A. Graber, Legal, Strategic or Legal Strategy:
Deciding to Decide during the Civil War and Reconstruction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 33, 35 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006); Howard
Gillman, The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism and the
Analysis of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW

INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 65, 79-80, 86 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999)
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mixes legal, strategic, and attitudinal considerations in ways that cannot be
fully isolated by scientific investigation." 28
Typically, though, most law professors and political scientists retreat to
their respective disciplinary approaches when pushed to explain a specific Supreme Court decision.29 Two academic conferences underscore this point.
First, the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) and the American
Political Science Association (APSA) jointly sponsored a Conference on ConstitutionalLaw during the summer of 2002. The purported goals of the conference were "ambitious," as it would "seek to foster interdisciplinary approaches to constitutional law." Specifically, law professors and political
scientists were to join together and become "part of a collaborative community." 30 Yet, despite these worthwhile goals, the respective and distinctive
disciplinary methods repeatedly surfaced throughout the conference. To be
sure, political scientists discussed law, and law professors discussed politics.
But, in the end, political scientists repeatedly and unequivocally assumed that
political attitudes primarily determined Justices' votes, while law professors
assumed that legal rules chiefly determined judicial outcomes. This result was
predictable. If one is trained in the methods of a particular discipline, then
when pressed to discuss a difficult case or problem, one naturally draws on
that methodological know-how. To use a perhaps trite metaphor, if you only
have a hammer, then you will try hammering, regardless of the problem.
My second example underscoring this point is the 2017 Pepperdine University School of Law Symposium Conference on The Supreme Court, Politics, and Reform. The call for proposals described the subject matter as follows: "Whether the political deadlock over the Merrick Garland nomination
provides a stark indication that the U.S. Supreme Court has become an unduly
political institution and, if so, what internal and external reforms might address this problem." 3 1 The crux of this call for papers was a concern that the

[hereinafter Gillman, The Courtas an Idea]; Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial
BehavioralistsTest the "LegalModel" ofJudicialDecisionMaking, 26 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 465, 492
(2001) [hereinafter Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It?].

28. Graber, supra note 27, at 35.
29.

Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal

Statutes?, 101 Am.POL. SCI. REV. 321, 331-34 (2007).
30. Announcements and Callsfor Papers,L. & CTS. (Ass'n of Am. L. Sch. & Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n,
Washington, D.C.), June 5-8, 2002, at 25, http://lawcourts.org/pubs/newsletter/winter01.pdf.
31.

Pepperdine Law Review to Host 2017 Symposium, PEPPERDINE UNIV. (Apr. 3, 2017),

https://www.pepperdine.edu/news/2017/04/pepperdine-law-review-host-2017-symposium/.
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Court "has become . . unduly political." Of course, "unduly" is an ambiguous qualifier, but from a pure-law perspective, any political influence is excessive or undue. For this reason, originalists repeatedly insist that constitutional interpretation is objective. 32 Moreover, according to the call for
proposals, if the Court has become (unduly) political, then the assumption was
that reform or remedy was necessary. In other words, the call for papers suggested that law professors would and should be disturbed by the possibility
that the Supreme Court is a political institution and must seek to retain the
purity of the legal system. If Supreme Court decision making is political, then
it is corrupt or illegitimate. Our very discipline, the law, depends on the existence of a distinct form of reasoning-legal reasoning-that can be explained and taught as separate from other disciplines, such as politics, economics, history, and sociology. 33 To be clear, I do not intend to criticize the
Pepperdine Law Review and the Pepperdine University School of Law. To
the contrary, I want to emphasize that Pepperdine is no different from any
other law school in this regard. At both the 2017 Pepperdine University
School of Law Symposium Conference and the 2002 joint AALS and APSA
Constitutional Law conference, many of the law professors were from schools
often ranked in the top twenty. I do not doubt that the top twenty schools
often tend to be more interdisciplinary than other schools, 34 but still, law professors most often talk about the law when discussing hard Supreme Court
cases.
Unquestionably, public commentators and politicians typically echo and
advocate for the pure-law view of Supreme Court decision making: the Justices should decide according to the rule of law and should not allow politics
to influence their votes or decisions. For example, in a New York Times OpEd, Ilya Shapiro wrote: "A judge's job is to apply the law to a given set of
facts as best he or she can and let the political chips fall where they may." 35
When he was still a Senator, Jeff Sessions said: "What our legal system demands . . is a fair and unbiased umpire, one who calls the game according to

32. E.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalismfor Nonoriginalists, 45 LOYOLA L. REV. 611, 621
(1999); see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return ofLochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527,

597 (2015) (emphasizing the importance of objectivity to originalism).
33.

See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949) (arguing that dis-

cussions of policy are appropriate only if there is a gap in the law).
34.
35.

J. M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarityas Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 950 (1996).
Ilya Shapiro, Opinion, ForSupreme CourtJustices, Only the Law and the ConstitutionShould

Matter,N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/01/26/the-suprem
e-court-meets-the-real-world/for-supreme-court-justices-only-the-law-and-the-constitution-should-matter.
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the existing rules." 36 During confirmation hearings, Supreme Court nominees
need to avow fealty to the rule of law. John Roberts famously stated, "Judges
and [J]ustices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are
like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they apply them . . . . [I]t's my
job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat." 37
If one holds to the pure-law view-that Supreme Court Justices should
follow the rule of law rather than making the rules to fit their political preferences-then when politics intrudes into the adjudicative process, the Court's
decisions become tainted. This concern, for the political tainting of the Court,
is precisely what precipitated this symposium. Numerous recent events have
supporters of the legal view worried about the politicization of the Court. 38
As the conference call for proposals suggested, the Senate Republicans' refusal to give Merrick Garland even a hearing or a confirmation vote, either up
or down, highlighted a political aspect to the Supreme Court's business. 39
This Republican refusal seemed to proclaim that the political orientation of a
Justice-or at least the political orientation of a Democratic nominee-would
affect his or her votes once on the Court.
Subsequent events have exacerbated concerns about the politicization of
the entire federal judiciary, not only the Supreme Court. When a federal district judge, James L. Robart, blocked Donald Trump's Executive Order Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, which
banned immigrants and travelers from seven predominantly Muslim countries, Trump publicly denounced Robart as a "so-called judge" and called the
ruling "ridiculous." 40 With an appeal pending at the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, Trump castigated the "courts [for] seem[ing] to be so political."'

36. Robert Schwartz, Opinion, Like They See 'Em, N.Y. TiMES (Oct. 6, 2005), at A37,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/06/opinion/like-they-see-em.html.
37.

John Roberts, Opening Statement During Confirmation Hearings Before Senate Judiciary

Committee, CNN (Sept. 12, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/.
38. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
AMERICAN JUDICIARY 1-7 (2016) (underscoring the questioning of the rule-of-law paradigm).
39. See KarounDemirjian, Republicansrefuse to budgefollowing Garlandnominationto Supreme

Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/03/
16/republicans-refuse-to-budge-following-garland-nomination-to-supreme-court/.
40. Fuller, supranote 2.
41.

Matt Shuham, Trump CriticizesJudges Deciding On His Order: 'Courts Seem To Be So Po-

litical,' TPM LIVEWIRE (Feb. 8, 2017), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/trump-says-courtwould-earn-respect-by-supporting-his-authority; Adam Liptak, Court Refuses to Reinstate Travel
Ban, Dealing TrumpAnother Legal Loss, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9,2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
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Many commentators believed that Trump's politically motivated attacks on
the judiciary threatened the rule of law.42 Even Justice Gorsuch, Trump's
nominee for the open Supreme Court seat, called Trump's attacks "demoralizing" and "disheartening." 43
III. SUPREME COURT ADJUDICATION Is LAW AND POLITICS
A.

The Law-Politics Dynamic

Most of these concerns about the politicization of the Court are ill-conceived. Supreme Court decision making is and always has been partly political. Simultaneously, Supreme Court decision making is and always has been
legal. Contrary to the predominant and opposed legal and political science
views, Supreme Court decision making arises from a law-politics dynamic.
Neither pure law nor pure politics determines Supreme Court votes and decisions. In most cases, the Justices sincerely interpret legal texts and precedents,
but the Justices' respective political horizons always influence how they interpret the law.
Legal interpretation ineluctably plants the law-politics dynamic within
adjudication. Most important, legal interpretation is never mechanical.
No
algorithmic method (or mechanical process) enables one to access some preexisting and pristine textual meaning. 4' Legal interpretation is never like an
arithmetic problem where the Justice adds the numbers and arrives at an indubitably correct answer.4' Despite this lack of method, however, interpretive
02/09/us/politics/appeals-court-trump-travel-ban.html.
42. Paul Butler, Opinion, Ginsburg Knows, IfTrump Wins, the Rule ofLaw Is atRisk, N.Y. TIMES

(Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/12/can-a-supreme-court-justicedenounce-a-candidate/ginsburg-knows-if-trump-wins-the-rule-of-law-is-at-risk.
43. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Supreme Court Nominee Calls Trump 'sAttacks on Judiciary Demor-

alizing,'N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/donald-trumpimmigration-ban.html.
44. Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It?, supra note 27, at 485-86; see HANS-GEORG

GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD xxi, 137, 140, 144, 159, 295, 309, 462 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald
G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989) (discussing how no method can lead unequivocally to an interpretive truth); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984) (explaining interpretation).
45. GADAMER, supra note 44, at 295, 309, 365; RONALD DWORKIN, How Law is Like Literature,
in AMATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146, 160 (1985).

46. See GADAMER, supra note 44, at 165, 294, 332, 372 (arguing that meaning is gleaned only
through interpretation or understanding); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

(G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 3d ed., 1958) (rejecting the picture theory of language); Stanley Fish, Dennis
Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1779 (1987) (arguing against theory as "an
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disputes have correct or right answers.47 Yet, the only means for gleaning the
correct meaning of a text is through interpretation itself.4 If one believes that
a proffered interpretation of a text is mistaken, then one can offer reasons that
might persuade the initial interpreter to accept a better textual reading. But
there is no escape from interpretation. 49
A Supreme Court Justice always interprets legal texts from within his or
her horizon. 0 The interpretive horizon metaphorically connotes the range of
possible understandings that an individual brings to any text. An interpreter
can see to the edge of the horizon but no farther. As a general matter, we are
empowered to understand texts, but we are also limited to understandings
within our respective horizons."' Significantly, a Justice's horizon (or anybody else's horizon, for that matter) arises from the Justice's experience and
education within a community (or communities) and the community's cultural
traditions.52 Consequently, political ideology contributes strongly to a Justice's horizon, yet the horizon is not solely a matter of politics, narrowly defined. Religion and other cultural components all contribute; one's horizon is
not a purely private possession.5 3 A Justice who was educated at an American
law school, practiced law, and decided prior cases understands and generally

abstract or algorithmic formulation that guides or governs practice from a position outside any particular conception of practice").
47. RONALD DwORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A MATTER OF
PRINCIPLE 119 (1985); see GADAMER, supra note 44, at 297-98 (discussing true textual meaning).
48. Jirgen Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality (1971), in JOSEF BLEICHER,
CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: HERMANEUTICS AS METHOD, PHILOSOPHY, AND CRITIQUE 181,

183 (1980).
49.

Id.; Jirgen Habermas, A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method, in UNDERSTANDING AND

SOCIAL INQUIRY 335, 357 (Fred R. Dallmayr & Thomas A. McCarthy eds., 1977).
50. GADAMER, supra note 44, at 282-84, 302, 306.
51. Id. at 133. The concept of the interpretive horizon resonates with a simple psychological point:
"All mental processing draws closely from one's background knowledge." Dan Simon, A Third View
ofthe Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal DecisionMaking, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 511, 536 (2004).

52. The Gadamerian concept of the horizon overlaps with Stanley Fish's concept of an interpretive
community. STANLEY FISH, Is There a Text in This Class?, in IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 303,
303-04 (1980); cf THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51 (2d ed.,

1970) (explaining the concept of a paradigm).
53. See GADAMER, supra note 44, at 282-84, 295, 302-09 (discussing concept of the interpretive
horizon). Thus, I agree with Eric Segall when he writes: "Political preferences drive the Justices'
constitutional decisions to some degree but so do their life experiences, religious and moral values,
and other subjective beliefs." SEGALL, supranote 24, at 8.

53

[Vol. 2017,43]

Nothing New Under the Sun
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

abides by the internal practices of law and adjudication. 4 Those internal practices-the know-how of the law-are part of the Justice's horizon.5 5 In most
cases, therefore, the Justice will attempt in good faith to interpret the relevant
legal texts correctly.5 ' But again, this interpretive process is not mechanical.
The Justice's political preferences (and religious and cultural background)
will influence the interpretive conclusions. This political influence is not a
corruption of the legal and judicial process; it is inherent to the process.5 7
Thus, when Justices Alito and Ginsburg disagree about the proper interpretation of the Commerce Clause, neither Justice is lying or being disingenuous.5 8
Each Justice believes that he or she is correctly interpreting the Constitution,
but their interpretive horizons shape their respective conclusions. 59
As politics always contributes to one's interpretive horizon, law and politics are inherently intertwined within legal interpretation. Consequently, Supreme Court decision making always entails the operation of a law-politics
dynamic. The concept of pure law within adjudication, of a pristine legal decision bereft of all political influence, is incoherent. Unsurprisingly, then, a
growing body of quantitative evidence corresponds with the proposition that
both law and politics-a law-politics dynamic-animates Supreme Court adjudication. First, as I already mentioned, political scientists have generated a

54. "All mental processing draws closely from one's background knowledge. A decision to cross
a street, for example, is contingent on one's experience-born knowledge about vehicles, motion, and
driver behavior." Simon, supra note 51, at 536.
55. "The very ability to formulate a [judicial] decision in terms that would be recognizably legal
depends on one's having internalized the norms, categorical distinctions, and evidentiary criteria that
make up one's understanding of what the law is." STANLEY FISH, Still Wrong After All These Years,
in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 356, 360 (1989); see Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer,

40 B.C. L. REV. 1041, 1045 (1999) (emphasizing that lawyers and judges remain committed to a traditional view of legal reasoning).
56. Gillman, The Court as an Idea, supra note 27, at 80; Whittington, supra note 16, at 623; see
STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 35-68 (1992) (emphasizing judges' good faith respon-

sibility to apply the law); TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 194 (emphasizing that judges internalize a
"commitment to engage in the good-faith application of the law.").
57. See GADAMER, supranote 44, at 282-84, 302, 306 (explaining horizon); Habermas, supranote
48, at 183 (explaining interpretation).
58. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 645, 647 (2012) (discussing the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act under the Commerce Clause); Feldman, Supreme Court
Nominees, supranote 5 (discussing whether Supreme Court nominees and Justices lie).
59. For further discussions of interpretation, see Stephen M. Feldman, The Problem of Critique:
TriangulatingHabermas, Derrida, and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY
296, 299-315 (2005); Stephen M. Feldman, Made for Each Other: The Interdependence ofDeconstruction and PhilosophicalHermeneutics, 26 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 51, 53-63 (2000).
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substantial body of quantitative evidence showing that the Justices' votes appear to follow their political preferences. Second, the political scientists Mark
J. Richards and Herbert M. Kritzer have performed several quantitative studies suggesting that legal doctrines shape judicial decisions. 0 "The Supreme
Court is not simply a small legislature," explain Mark J. Richards and Herbert
M. Kritzer. "Law matters in Supreme Court decision making in ways that are
specifically jurisprudential." 6 More "[s]pecifically, jurisprudential regimes
structure Supreme Court decision making by establishing which case factors
are relevant for decision making and/or by setting the level of scrutiny the
Justices are to employ in assessing case factors." 62 Third, recent studies suggest that both law and politics contribute to judicial decisions in an uncertain
and shifting mix. One book summarizes its quantitative studies as concluding
"that ideology influences judicial decisions at all levels of the federal judiciary. But the influence is not of uniform strength-we have found, for example, that it diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy-and it does
not extinguish the influence of conventional principles of judicial decisionmaking."6 3 Another book-length quantitative study concludes that both law
and political preferences matter to Supreme Court Justices, 4 though "the influence of specific legal doctrines varies across Justices." 6 5
To appreciate the implications of the law-politics dynamic for Supreme
Court decision making, one should distinguish politics writ large from politics
writ small. 66 Politics writ large is the purposeful or self-conscious pursuit of

60. Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, JurisprudentialRegimes and Supreme Court Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause Cases, 37 L. & SoC'Y REV. 827, 829-3 9

(2003) (analyzing the Lemon regime); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, JurisprudentialRegimes in Supreme CourtDecisionMaking, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 310-16 (2002) (analyzing the
Grayned regime).

61. Richards & Kritzer, supra note 60, at 315.
62. Id. Thomas Keck concludes that judges decide cases "partly in light of distinctive judicial
values and practices." THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TiMES 4 (2014).
63. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 385 (2013). "[F]ederal judges are

not just politicians in robes, though that is part of what they are...." Id.
64.

MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS,

AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE 15-16 (2011).
65. Id. at 143; see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (study of federal courts of appeals concluding that both politics

and law influence judges). Frank Cross has conducted numerous quantitative studies concluding that
law and politics both influence judicial decision making. FRANK B. CROSS, Law is Politics, in WHAT'S
LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 92 (Charles Gardner Geyh ed., 2011); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson,
StrategicInstitutionalEffects on Supreme CourtDecisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2001).

66. Feldman, Supreme CourtNominees, supra note 5 at 18-19, 30-37 (distinguishing politics writ
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political goals qua political goals. Members of Congress routinely engage in
politics writ large. If a Supreme Court Justice were to ignore the law and
purposefully vote to decide a case in accord with a preferred political goal qua
political goal, then that Justice would be pursuing politics writ large.
But in
most cases, the Justices do not do so. Instead, they engage in politics writ
small. That is, in the typical case, a Justice sincerely interprets the relevant
legal texts and votes to decide a case accordingly-with the Justice's horizon,
including political ideology, naturally shaping the Justice's interpretation and
vote." Politics writ small is embedded in legal interpretation, or in other
words, legal interpretation is politics writ small.
Crucially, a Justice's sincere interpretation of a legal text typically corresponds with his or her political goals precisely because of politics writ small.
This correspondence occurs because the Justice's political ideology, as part of
his or her interpretive horizon, influences the Justice's interpretive conclusions. Thus, a Justice rarely experiences a conflict between his or her sincere
interpretations of the relevant texts and his or her political preferences.69 A
Justice rarely has to choose between law and politics because legal interpretation arises from the law-politics dynamic.
Once we understand the relationship between politics writ small and judicial decision making, then we can fully appreciate the significance of the
previously discussed quantitative evidence. Quite reasonably, some quantitative studies demonstrate that the Justices follow the law, other studies demonstrate that they follow their politics, and yet other studies demonstrate that
they follow both the law and the politics. All of these studies make sense once

large from politics writ small).
67. Many commentators point to Bush v. Gore as an example of Supreme Court politics writ large.
The conservative Justices disregarded prior equal protection precedents and voted as they did merely
because they wanted George W. Bush rather than Al Gore to be the next President. 531 U.S. 98
(2000); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: HOW THE COURT DECIDED THE 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2-5, 185-89 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L.
REv. 757, 759 (2001).
68. See Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy, supra note 5, at 82-83 (distinguishing politics writ

large from politics writ small); TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 187-89 (distinguishing cognitive framing
from willful judging).
69. Cognitive psychology research demonstrates that when an individual confronts a complex decision, his or her cognitive system will shift "toward a state of coherence with either one of the decision
alternatives." Simon, supra note 51, at 517. According to "coherence-based reasoning" research,
when a Justice must decide a case, the Justice's legal and political views will tend ultimately to coincide rather than conflict. Id. at 517. This tendency to reach coherent conclusions is perfectly natural
and often unconscious.
EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 30, 157-58 (2009); Simon, supranote 51, at 545-46.
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we recognize that Supreme Court decision making is politics writ small: when
the Justices interpret the law, they simultaneously follow their politics (writ
small).70
B.

The Politics of the Debate Over Supreme CourtAdjudication

If we return to the question raised by the conference call for proposalshave recent controversies revealed that the Court has become (unduly) political?-the answer is, "No." The Court has always interpreted the law and decided cases pursuant to a law-politics dynamic, pursuant to politics writ small,
in other words. That has not apparently changed. To be sure, if the Court
were to begin deciding pursuant to politics writ large, then we could discuss
a significant transition. But the evidence does not support that conclusion.
Of course, recent controversies have spotlighted the political aspect of
Supreme Court decision making. Consequently, public perceptions of the
Court's adjudicative process might have shifted. Yet, public opinion polls
leave much ambiguity regarding widespread perceptions of Supreme Court
decision making. Generally, people seem to criticize the Court for being either too liberal or too conservative based on the respondent's own political
attitudes and recent (newsworthy) Court decisions.7 A conservative Republican is unlikely to criticize the Court for being too conservative when recent
decisions are conservative (likewise for liberal Democrats). Unsurprisingly,
polls reveal that the public has had wildly fluctuating approval and disapproval ratings of the Court. Most likely, these inconsistent ratings reflect recent rulings and the public's political mood. 72 If anything, then, one might
infer from the polls that many people implicitly subscribe to the pure-law
view. When the Court reaches an agreeable decision-agreeable from an individual's political standpoint-then the individual apparently views the decision as following from the rule of law. The Court is condemned for being
an unduly political institution only when it reaches decisions that contravene
a respondent's political views.
Finally, any polls concerning public perceptions of the Court should be
approached warily. Surveys suggest that most Americans know and care little

70. E.g., BAILEY & MALTZMAN, supra note 64, at 143; EPSTEIN, supra note 63, at 385.
71. Bruce Drake, 5 Facts About the Supreme Court, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 26, 2016),

http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/26/5-facts-about-the-supreme-court/.
72. GALLUP, Supreme Court, http://www.gallup.com/poll/473 2/supreme -court.aspx (last visited
Mar. 6, 2017).
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about the Court. One 2016 poll revealed that almost 10% of college graduates
believed the television judge, Judge Judy, sat on the Court; the percentage
rose to 13.1 when the poll expanded beyond college graduates.7 3 A 2015 poll
found that 32% of Americans could not identify the Supreme Court as a
branch of the United States government, while 28% believed 5-4 Court rulings
were "sent back either to Congress for reconsideration or to the lower courts
for a decision."
My own (anecdotal) experience suggests the need for skepticism when
evaluating public perceptions of the Court. Shortly after Justice Scalia's
death, I happened to go to the dentist. My dentist, an articulate man approximately in his mid-30s and obviously a graduate of college and dental school,
knows that I am a law professor. Consequently, he told me that he thought
Scalia was a great Justice. By coincidence, I had recently published an article
on the history of originalism. When I soon needed to return to the dentist, I
asked him with trepidation if he would be interested in reading my article. His
response? He had never heard of originalism. At that point, I decided not to
ask him why he admired Scalia.
Nevertheless, this incident with my dentist suggests a larger point. Individual viewpoints about the Supreme Court and its method of decision making
are political. 5 Even people like my dentist who know little or nothing about
constitutional theory and interpretation can have strong opinions about the
Court-if they think about the Court at all. Thus, while recent controversies
about the Court and judicial decision making have neither changed Supreme
Court adjudication, nor have they rendered Supreme Court decision making
unduly political-these controversies might have temporarily stirred public
awareness of and debates about the Court. For instance, exit polls from the
2016 presidential election revealed that 2 1 % of voters named Supreme Court

73. A Crisis in Civic Education, AM. COUNCIL OF TR. & ALUMNI, A CRISIS IN Civic EDUCATION

5 (Jan. 2016), https://www.goacta.org/images/download/ACrisis in CivicEducation.pdf.
74. Is There a ConstitutionalRight to Own a Home or a Pet? Many Americans Don'tKnow, THE
ANNENBERG PUB. POL'Y CTR. OF THE UNIV. OF PA. (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.annenbergpublicpol

icycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Civic-knowledge-survey-Sept.-2015.pdf.
75. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, InstitutionalFlip-Flops, 94 TEx. L. REv. 485 (2016) (arguing that vigorous institutional commitments-for example, to federalism-change when necessary
to fit one's political ideology).
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appointments as the most important factor in determining their votes,7 6 an increase of 14% over the 2008 election.
Even so, prior to the 2016 election,
surveys suggested that Supreme Court appointments was only the ninth most
important issue.7 8
Regardless, many law professors, political scientists, lawyers, judges,
public commentators, and politicians care intensely about Supreme Court decision making. Like with my dentist, though, when such individuals express
their views about the Court, their statements often arise from their political
orientations. 79 Their statements are often politically motivated and can have
political consequences. For example, in an essay published in 2005, Justice
Gorsuch, still a practicing attorney at the time, suggested his belief in a purelaw viewpoint while blaming liberals for politicizing the judiciary. 0 According to Gorsuch, "liberal activists" had "become addicted to the courtroom."
Consequently, the judiciary was "losing its legitimacy," and judges were being "viewed and treated as little more than politicians with robes." 8 2
Gorsuch's claims underscore what is at stake politically in disputes about
the nature of judicial decision making. Most often, those who claim that Supreme Court decisions should be pristine, based on a pure rule of law, seek to

76.

Election 2016, Exit Polls, NationalPresident, CNN POLITICS (Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.cnn

.com/election/results/exit-polls.
77.

NBC News Exit Poll: Future Supreme CourtAppointments Important Factor in Presidential

Voting, NBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/card/nbc-news-exit-poll-future-suprem
e-court-appointments-important-factor-n680381.
78. Top Voting Issues in 2016 Election, PEW RES. CTR. (July 7, 2016), http://www.people-press.
org/20 16/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-20 16-election/.
79.

See Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, An EmpiricalStudy ofPoliticalBias in Legal Schol-

arship, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 279-304 (2015) (presenting empirical study showing that political
ideology influences legal scholarship). If one focuses on the opposition between the traditional views
of law professors and political scientists, one can readily recognize that members of both professions
have vested political interests in bolstering their respective disciplinary outlooks and methods. This
is simple turf protection. MICHELE LAMONT, HOW PROFESSORS THINK: INSIDE THE CURIOUS WORLD

OF ACADEMIC JUDGMENT (2009) (comparing evaluative criteria in different disciplines); Ross J. Corbett, PoliticalTheory within PoliticalScience, 44 POL. SCI. & POL. 565 (2011) (emphasizing that many

political scientists try to exclude non-quantifiable or non-falsifiable methods from the discipline). See
generally STEVE FULLER, PHILOSOPHY, RHETORIC, AND THE END OF KNOWLEDGE: A NEW
BEGINNING FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (1993) (emphasizing the effects of disciplinary

boundaries).
80. Neil Gorsuch, Liberals'NLawsuits,NAT'L REv. (Feb. 7, 2005), http://www.nationalreview.c
om/article/213590/liberalsnlawsuits-joseph-6. Gorsuch lamented "[t]he judiciary's diminishing claim
to neutrality and independence." Id.
8 1.
82.

Id.
Id.
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seize the political high ground. These advocates insist that they are politically
neutral and that Court decisions should also be politically neutral. Any intrusion of politics into Supreme Court decision making corrupts the judicial process. For the last fifty years or so, dating back to the Warren Court, conservatives have typically articulated this position (and continue to do so). For them,
a conservative Supreme Court decision is a politically neutral decision.
Hence, originalists insist that originalism is the only legitimate method of constitutional interpretation because all other methods allow politics to influence
interpretive conclusions.83 Regardless, as the Roberts Court has solidified the
conservative hold on the Supreme Court, progressives have begun to flip the
argument upside down.8 4 In 2015, Democratic Senator Sheldon Whitehouse
criticized the "extreme judicial activism within the conservative bloc of Justices on the Supreme Court-reaching a new pinnacle under Chief Justice
John Roberts."
IV. CONCLUSION:
THE FUTILITY AND HARM OF A PURE-LAW APPROACH

Ultimately, to insist that the Supreme Court follow a purely legal approach, that politics should not influence Court decisions, is futile (from a
scholarly rather than political perspective) because legal interpretation and judicial decision making are inherently politics writ small. The law-politics dynamic cannot be subdued and eliminated. As I have argued elsewhere, to argue for pure law is like fighting the tofu." One can try to overcome the lawpolitics dynamic, to eradicate politics from judicial decision making-and
many scholars have tried-but one's efforts will be as frustrating as wrestling
with a squiggly, white, gelatinous mass of tofu. The law-politics dynamic-

83. Am. Trucking Assn's v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). Conservatives are fond of saying: "It takes a theory to beat a theory and, after a decade of trying, the opponents
of originalism have never congealed around an appealing and practical alternative." Randy E. Barnett,
An Originalismfor Nonoriginalists,45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 617 (1999). The few progressive original-

ists tend to recast the theory so that it more readily justifies progressive outcomes. See, e.g., JACK M.
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALIsM 6-7 (2011).
84. JASON E. WHITEHEAD, JUDGING JUDGES: VALUES AND THE RULE OF LAW 1-3 (2014) (noting

that judges on both sides of the political divide criticize the other side for not following the rule of
law).
85. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, Conservative JudicialActivism: The Politicizationofthe Supreme
Court Under ChiefJusticeRoberts, 9 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 195, 195 (2015).
86. Feldman, Fighting the Tofu, supranote 5. NATALIE GOLDBERG, WRITING DOWN THE BONES:

FREEING THE WRITER WITHIN 25 (2005 ed.) (explaining the metaphor of fighting the tofu).
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that is, politics writ small-will remain part of adjudication no matter how
much or how often scholars deny it, police it, or otherwise try to subdue it.
The quest for pure law is also likely to be harmful. Advocates for pure
law resemble neoliberal advocates for a pure or free economic marketplace.
Neoliberals (and other libertarians) pressure us into seemingly endless arguments over the scope of government regulation and interference with the free
market. Market failures are inevitably blamed on government interference.
In other words, according to neoliberals, the market works best or even perfectly when government-that is, politics-is banished. But as Robert Reich
underscores, the free market is a myth.89 Economic transactions do not occur
unless the government designs and enforces the rules of the marketplace.
Hence, instead of wasting time debating government restrictions on the market, we should examine and discuss the effectiveness and fairness of the current rules and possible government improvements of the marketplace.90
Likewise, advocates for pure law (as well as political scientists arguing
for pure politics) pressure us to dwell on the degree to which politics is contaminating our judicial processes. For instance, we devote endless resources
to debates over originalism versus non-originalism or to arcane distinctions
among various manifestations of originalism. Should we be old originalists
or new originalists? 9 1 Which originalist approach will take us to the most
refined, the purest, level of constitutional meaning-bereft of political infestation? But instead of seeking the impossible, the banishment of politics from
Supreme Court decision making, we should be exploring the operation and
manifestations of the law-politics dynamic.92
Here is an example. In 2015, Genevieve Lakier published an article, The

87. Feldman, Fightingthe Tofu, supranote 5.
88. For discussions of neoliberalism, see generally DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE
UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS (2012); Stephen M. Feldman, The End ofthe Cold War: Can American ConstitutionalismSurvive Victory?, 41 OHIO N. U. L.

REV. 261, 300-14 (2015).
89. ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW 3-6, 84-85 (2015);
see also THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 20-21 (Arthur Goldhammer

trans., 2014) (emphasizing that economic inequality arises from political choices rather than unalterable market forces).
90. REICH, supra note 89, at 6-7, 11, 153-54.
91.

Stephen M. Feldman, ConstitutionalInterpretationand History: New Originalism or Eclecti-

cism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283, 284-86 (2014) (distinguishing old and new originalisms).
92.

Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force ofthe Constitution'sSecret

DraftingHistory, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1114 (2003) (arguing that originalism is "working itself pure").
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Invention of Low-Value Speech, in the HarvardLaw Review.9 3 Lakier provides a historical critique of the two-level theory of free speech.9 4 According
to the two-level theory, the First Amendment fully protects most expression
but does not protect (or weakly protects) certain low-value categories of expression, such as incitement, obscenity, and fighting words.95 As Lakier correctly points out, the post-1937 New Deal Court basically invented the twolevel theory while simultaneously asserting that it was historically grounded
in the original understanding of the First Amendment. 96 Despite the New Deal
Court's historical errors, most subsequent courts and commentators have accepted many of its assertions.97
Lakier gets most of the history correct. 98 The problem is that her argument revolves almost entirely around theory and doctrine-the history of the
two-level theory and the doctrine of free speech. Lakier's history is arid and
bereft of nuance. In actuality, the New Deal Court forged the two-level theory
in the crucible of political crisis. During the 1930s and early 1940s, the nation
confronted mass industrialization, urbanization, dramatic shifts in population
demographics, a massive and long economic depression, the rise of totalitarian and fascist governments abroad, and a World War. 99 Early in the 1930s,
the practices of American democracy dramatically changed, and those new
practices were described and justified by the development of pluralist democratic theory late in the decade and over the next twenty years or so.100 One
cannot fully grasp the Court's incredible transformation of free-speech doctrine during these years, including the emergence of the two-level theory,
without accounting for this crucial political context. How much did the Court
alter its approach to free-speech issues? During the World War I era and the

93.

Genevieve Lakier, The Invention ofLow-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REv. 2166, 2168-70

(2015).
94.

Id.

95. Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 790-91 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010).
96. Chaplinskyv. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942); Lakier, supra note 93, at 21972207.
97. Lakier, supranote 93, at 2207-11.
98. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 392407 (2008) (explaining how the two-level theory emerged shortly after the 1937 Supreme Court turn).
99. Id. at 291-348, 383-419.
100. Id. at 291-382. For examples of political and constitutional theorists articulating pluralist democracy, see generally WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. MOOS, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN
POLITICS: THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1949); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY (1956); V.0. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS (1942).
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1920s, the Court upheld every government punishment of expression.101 The
First Amendment protection of speech and writing was flimsy, at best. But
starting in 1937 and in the immediately following years, the Court upheld one
First Amendment claim after another. 0 2 Free expression became, quite suddenly, a constitutional "lodestar[]."10 3
Why does it matter that Lakier presents a thin history of free-expression
developments? Because based on her history (of theory and doctrine), she
recommends a rather tepid modification of the Roberts Court's approach to
free speech. Lakier does not face the political, social, and economic crises
confronting the nation today and the potential implications of those crises for
free expression. Like the New Deal court, the Roberts Court faces a nation
and world in critical flux.' 4 The nation and world today are characterized by
deteriorating international agreements, the rise of new authoritarian demagogues, the Internet and digital technology, gross income and wealth inequality in the United States and the world, mass incarceration in America, unprecedented political polarization in America, multinational corporations,
globalization, mass surveillance, and terrorism around the world.o' Yet, the

101. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670-72 (1925) (upholding state criminal syndicalism conviction); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919) (upholding Espionage Act
conviction); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919) (upholding Espionage Act convictions); see FELDMAN, supranote 98, at 241-91 (explaining free expression during World War I).
102. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1940) (holding that labor picketing is
protected free speech); Schneiderv. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (invalidating conviction for distributing handbills); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 531-32 (1939) (upholding right
of unions to organize in streets).
103. G. Edward White, The FirstAmendment Comes ofAge: The Emergence ofFree Speech in
Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 299, 300-01 (1996).
104.

See generally KARL

POLANYI,

THE GREAT

TRANSFORMATION:

THE POLITICAL

AND

ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2001 ed.) (explaining massive changes of the early-twentieth century).
105.

See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE

OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012 ed.) (discussing mass incarceration); NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL.,
POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2008) (discussing polarization); KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES (1995)

(discussing multinational corporations); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2016) (discussing digital technology and
the Internet); PIKETTY, supra note 89 (discussing inequality); DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION
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Nothing New Under the Sun
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Roberts Court decides free-expression cases by invoking originalism and the
traditional philosophical rationales for free expression such as self-governance and the marketplace of ideas.o' The Court decides cases like Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, upholding (or creating) a right for
corporations to spend unlimited sums on political campaigns, and then the
Justices claim that their conclusion is neutral and apolitical. 0 7
But, of course, the Court's decisions, including Citizens United, are never
neutral and apolitical. The law-politics dynamic always animates legal interpretation. The Justices cannot escape politics writ small. When law professors propagate a pure-law account of Supreme Court decision making, we implicitly encourage disregard of the social, economic, and political contexts and
ramifications of decisions. Even if we spout platitudes such as "we are all
realists now" but then retreat to the parsing of cases and the analyses of doctrine to explain judicial decisions, we present only a partial and misleading
depiction of the decision making process. Instead of exploring the operation
of the law-politics dynamic, we worry about whether politics is contaminating
Supreme Court adjudication. It is well past time for law professors to realistically analyze and assess Supreme Court decision making.

pulsive-demagogue-in-the-white-house (characterizing Trump as authoritarian populist); Pippa Norris, It's Not Just Trump. AuthoritarianPopulism is RisingAcross the West. Here's Why, WASH. POST

(Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-justtrump-authoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres-why/ (discussing authoritarian populism).
106. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 353 (2009) (invoking original meaning of First Amendment to support invalidation of restrictions on corporate campaign spending); id. at 339 (invoking selfgovernance rationale); id. at 354 (invoking the marketplace-of-ideas or search-for-truth rationale).
107. Id.; Stephen M. Feldman, Is the ConstitutionLaissez Faire?The Framers, OriginalMeaning,

and the Market, 81 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (2015) (explaining that the framing generation did not endorse
capitalism, much less laissez-faire capitalism).
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